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In my address this evening I intend to 
discuss a number of issues that I consider 
important for hermeneutics to attend to, in 
light of some current postmodemist 
attitudes. The substance of the address 
has grown in a general way from a certain 
sense of unease which I have experienced 
over a number of years in relation to 
postmodemist theories. The issues have 
been more sharply focussed for me by 
events in my teaching this last semester, 
and above all by my experience in 
co-writing the initial "methodology" 
chapters of a book on women and 
religion1. 
I shall begin my discussion with two 
. brief stories, both related to my 
undergraduate class on Religious 
Literature. During last semester, this class 
read in part or full the Vedas, Upanishads, 
Bhagavadgita, Hebrew scriptures, 
Christian scriptures, and the Qur' an. 
There was much discussion during the 
semester on both an intellectual and 
personal level, much of the latter related 
to various aspects of the students' 
religious upbringing. Only one member 
of the class had had no religious 
upbringing, nor ever any experience that 
she would identify as being of a religious 
nature. To many, she seemed the ideal 
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type, an "innocent" reader, a tabula rasa, 
coming to texts for the first time. 
Towards the end of the semester, this 
student unexpectedly challenged the view 
of her privileged status as reader, when 
she spoke of her frustration at listening to 
what others in the class had to say of their 
experience of reading, all the while 
feeling herself more and more 
disadvantaged, like an outsider. She felt 
she lacked a way of reading the texts as 
religious literature, being able to read 
only in a literary sense, not really 
appreciating the texts or getting as much 
out of the texts as the others were. 
My second story relates to the same 
class. Towards the end of the semester, 
we came to the topic of the ethics of 
interpretation. As part of the process, I 
asked the class to read my recent article 
on Isaiah 472, at the end of which I offer 
a postscript in which I judge that the use 
of the metaphor of Yahweh as warrior in 
Isaiah is inappropriate or morally 
questionable when it leads to the 
possibility of presenting Yahweh as a 
warrior-rapist. I make this judgment for 
the Christian community who reads the 
text today, but also suggest that the 
metaphor was inappropriate even for the 
community from whom the text 
originated. 
The class agreed that my judgment 
was appropriate for contemporaneous 
Christian communities, but most 
disagreed quite strongly with judging the 
originating community. It was invalid to 
judge the moral appropriateness of a 
metaphor for a different culture and time, 
to judge the ancient Hebrew community 
by my modem Western standards of 
morality. Yet these same students, in an 
earlier class on Women and Religion, 
when confronted by details of some 
women's experience of female 
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circumcision in another religio-cultural 
setting, either made some statement about 
the immorality of the practice in any 
cultural setting - in other words, a 
universal moral claim - or were very 
uneasy about it, being philosophically 
opposed to making such claims yet 
wanting to. 
The first story raises basic questions 
about the person who reads. How does 
one read really; how does one appreciate; 
how does one understand; ... ? The class, 
myself included, had made some 
presumptions about the innocent reader, 
the reader without baggage, or at least 
without religious baggage, the purity of 
her engagement without a heavy overlay 
of emotional attachment, either negative 
or positive, to some religious system. In 
. this particular case, what does the reading 
demand of its reader? What more did my 
student need? Surely her reading was just 
as valid as anyone else's? And if that is 
so, why was she dissatisfied? Can we 
discriminate about how valuable certain 
readings are? 
I began my reflection on these 
questions from the simple idea of the 
subjectivity of the reading process. I 
doubt that anyone would disagree much 
with the idea that interpreting or reading a 
text is highly subjective3; that every 
reading is subjective, that each reading 
produces a new text unique to the 
perspective of the one who reads. No one 
else has my history, nor can they stand in 
my exact position to view the world. All 
this is self-evidently true, along with the 
statement that there is an infmity of 
possible interpretations when one engages 
texts. 
Further, the process of interpretation 
itself is never completed. It is always 
open-ended, a process of apprehending, 
of beJng engaged with a text. For most of 
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us, the everyday experience results in 
more questions at the end of the process 
than at the beginning, so that we never 
really have any e~pectation of reaching a 
result which is a definitive or absolute 
answer as to the meaning of the text4. 
However, this basic point about the 
subjectivity of the reading process is only 
one aspect of the reality of the situation; a 
description of what individual human 
beings do from one angle, only a 
description of what happens to a text as it 
is read. It says nothing of the history of 
reception of the text, nothing of the 
broader context of reading beyond the 
individual. To limit oneself to such a 
partial description of the reading process 
as if it were the full story and to assert 
that the text is solely the product or 
artefact of the one who reads/interprets is 
to occupy an absurdly and extremely 
solipsistic and anthropocentric position, 
as Paul Noble writes in relation to the 
work of Stanley Fish: 
... the paradoxical conclusion to which Fish's 
version of anti-foundationalism inexorably 
leads is that there is an infinite regress of in-
terpretations of interpretations of interpreta-
tions without him being able to posit 
anything which this is ultimately an interpreta-
tion of. In other words, if his epistemology 
does not altogether abolish the world as some-
thing existing independently of the interpreter 
then it reduces it to a Kantian "thing-in-it-
self' about which absolutely nothing can be 
'd 5 saz ... 
Returning to my first story, if we were 
to ask my student if her reading was 
unique, was it equally as valid as all the 
other readings, and so on, she could 
answer "yes", but despite the theory, the 
practice for her was unsatisfactory. And 
she identified why it was unsatisfactory: 
she had no history of religious 
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experience, no community of believers of -
one kind or another, in which to 
contextualise her reading. She had a 
community of sorts (in this case, literary 
theorists), but not one that helped her read 
these particular texts as she wanted. In 
identifying the source of her difficulty, 
she identified the broader problem in 
holding too narrow a theory about the 
reader. 
To view the process of reading only 
from the point of view of the individual 
reader is myopic. Such an excessively 
relativist position assumes that shared 
human existence is unimportant in the 
process of interpretation, that the idea of a 
context for the process within history and 
the sensus communis is passe6, that there 
are ultimately no universal norms about 
which we might agree that have a bearing 
on how we read and the kinds of 
judgments we make about what readings 
are good or appropriate. 
The second story raises more strongly 
this issue about discriminating between 
various readings, and the possibility of 
making a judgment about material that 
may be more broadly applied by the 
individual who reads than just to ·his/her 
own experience. With regard to the latter 
point, it has become fashionable to move 
from the idea of the infinite possibilities 
of interpretation and the open-ended 
nature of interpretation, to the necessity 
of the suspension of judgment, as if that 
were the logical outcome of the 
subjective process of interpretation. 
Because I cannot say anything absolute 
about the meaning of a text, I cannot 
make a judgment about anything. 
Because there are infinite interpretations, 
every interpretation must be tolerated. 
One must be totally open. It seems to me 
that this creates a situation of some kind 
of amoral vacuum, where all absolutes 
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are gone and no truth remains to which 
one may commit oneself. There are only 
shifting sands - nowhere to stand -where 
nothing may .be truly communicated or 
meaningfully said. What was simply a 
partial description of how human beings 
interpret and attempt to understand in an 
ever-changing world, has become a moral 
paradigm or rather an amoral paradigm. 
Against the argument for the 
suspension of moral judgment, I want to 
assert that the logical outcome of the 
subjective process of interpretation is that 
one must make judgments, and that in fact 
it is not possible to suspend them. It is 
simply not possible to engage any text 
without making some judgment, without 
taking some position in relation to it, and 
this· is so because such engagement is a 
subjective process. If we take seriously 
the complexity of what goes to make up a 
human person, then we must consider all 
the aspects of ourselves which are at 
work in understanding, including all those 
levels of feeling and reaction which guide 
the rational aspects of ourselves in 
powerful and subtle ways. The judgments 
about what we are trying to understand 
are never just rational academic 
judgments but they are also intimately 
applied to our life in general in all its 
aspects, either explicitly or implicitly. 
Our stance both throughout and at the 
conclusion of the process is non-neutral. 
I cannot emphasise too strongly that 
this emotional or psychological reaction 
of the interpreter is integral to the entire 
process. Already· from the very 
beginning there is a reaction to material 
which puts the intetpreter in a certain 
position over against the text. In other 
words, we already position ourselves in 
relation to the object in the event of 
engaging it, not afterwards when we 
consciously attempt perhaps to make 
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some judgment about its meaning. And 
the interpreter who positions 
herself/himself in the beginning, 
continues to shift and adjust position in 
both positiv((,and negative ways as the 
engagement continues. 
The key aspect of the process for the 
academic interpreter is the attempt to 
integrate the personal and involuntary 
reaction to the material studied with the 
intellectual exercise of applying questions 
and paradigms consciously, and in the 
end to enter into dialogue with others 
from a position which is fully 
acknowledged as both personal and 
intellectual. Philosophers have debated 
for a long time the place of bias or 
prejudice, in the neutral sense of those 
words, in the hermeneutical process, but I 
have yet to find a study that takes 
seriously that this positioning of the self 
in relation to the material studied is an 
integral part of the entire hermeneutical 
process and not just something to be 
reflected upon and acknowledged as a 
kind of addendum to the beginning of the 
process, the acknowledgment of prejudice 
or preunderstanding before the real 
intellectual work begins 7. 
An extreme example related to my 
second story may clarify further what I 
mean by the complementary nature of the 
personal and intellectual aspects for the 
entire process of interpretation. When 
dealing with the issue of female 
circumcision, my immediate reaction to 
the material is a sense of horror; I have a 
sense of outrage from my body even 
before I begin to think about any of the 
issues. When I do begin to engage the 
relevant material from an academic point 
of view, trying to understand the practice 
within its cultural and/or religious setting, 
within women's experience, and so on (to 
avoid by such contextualisation the 
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"fallacy of detachable cultural 
descriptions")8, at the same time I am 
aware of my continuing personal reaction. 
For those who espouse cultural or 
ethical relativism, no judgments can be 
made about this kind of practice. This is a 
case of another culture, another woman's 
experience, and I cannot hope to 
represent this experience nor to make 
judgments on it from my limited 
perspective. If I dare to make a judgment, 
I can be so easily branded as a Western 
colonialist, so I am encouraged to play 
the intellectual "tolerance and openness 
game". All the while I am experiencing 
feelings of revulsion and I have taken a 
personal position that is not reflected in 
my intellectual discussions. I have lost 
my sense of integrity; I have no 
committed position; I am a vacuum of 
non-judgment, an amoral and totally 
empty discussion partner. 
Granted that this is an extreme 
example, it nevertheless raises the 
question of what kinds of judgments I can 
validly make about what I am 
interpreting. If judgments are made even 
involuntarily within the process of 
interpretation, how do I distinguish which 
ones are good and appropriate? 
Colonialist tendencies are indeed a very 
real danger that do not belong just to the 
past. On the other hand, one could also 
ask, are all judgments acceptable just 
because there are an infinity of them?9 
I want to suggest a way of proceeding 
that takes a middle path which lies 
between the two options of total openness 
combined with suspension of judgment, 
and making a fmal judgment on material, 
irrespective of its appropriateness. Since 
judgment will inevitably occur, it seems 
to me that we must take our position on 
material but take it with an openness to 
dialogue about it, and to continue reading 
in order to attempt constantly to 
discriminate what might be valuable and 
what not. We do not have some absolute 
truth about the material, but we have an 
opinion, a reaction. The kind of truth that 
we have is the acknowledgment that we 
have had a reaction, that we have taken a 
position. 
The point about dialogue brings me 
back to the community (both one's own 
community and other communities) as 
context of the activity both of reading and 
of judging. This is the context for making 
judgment and taking judgment, for 
judging with a community and against it, 
for judging between communities of 
differing cultures and historical settings. 
This assumes that there is some shared 
bond between human beings that makes 
this possible, whether one sees that as 
language as Gadamer10, or as ethical 
reasonableness or a divine element in the 
soul like Aristotle, or perhaps sorne basic 
ground of being like Caputo: 
For whether or not one believes in God or 
mystics, one can still speak of something like 
a ground or fine point of the soul, a certain 
deep spot in the mind where the constructions 
of science grow dim and the cunning of com-
mon sense and the agility of phronesis go 
limp, where they wither away and lose their 
power ... there is a fine point in the mind 
where one is brought up short, a moment of 
midnight reckoning where the ground gives 
way and one also has the distinct sense of fall-
ing into an abyss. 11 
Even if we accept that there is some 
bond between human beings and 
communities, we are faced with the fact 
that not all communities will agree on or 
behave out of common ethical positions. 
However, this does not necessarily 
invalidate judgments made about basic 
values. Alan Bnchanan argues that it is 
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highly implausible that there are no basic 
values shared with past communities and 
across quite culturally different 
communities. 
According to the very concept of human 
rights, the validity of statements about human 
rights does not depend upon the fact (if it is a 
fact) that all cultures happen to share certain 
values by reference to which such statements 
can be justified. Even if it should turn out that 
there exists a culture whose values cannot be 
appealed to to justify the statement that there 
is a human right not to be tortured, for exam-
ple, it does not follow that there is no such hu-
man right. Whether there is a human right not 
to be tortured depends only on whether the 
statement ~'The right not to be tortured is a 
human right" can be justified by reference to 
the morally relevant features of human beings 
as such, not upon whether all cultures happen 
to include values that can be invoked in such 
a justification. 12 
One must ask at this point specifically 
about judging communities in the past. 
This was the difficult point for my class 
with regard to making a judgment on the 
ancient Hebrew community. It often 
seems to me that arguments against 
judging communities in the past are based 
in a sort of arrogance that assumes that 
moral or ethical life is something that has 
been evolving, and that modern 
communities are thereby much more 
moral or responsible in this regard. This 
kind of thinking is similar to that which 
informs theories about the evolution of 
religious life from primitive animistic 
beliefs to the "higher" monotheistic 
systems. Of course, we have more 
knowledge about certain things in our 
world (and we have lost knowledge also) 
that can infonn our ethical decision 
making, but that does not make us more 
ethical people than those in the past, and 
that we should be held as more 
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responsible and open to judgment about 
our ethical choices. 
Who makes the decision about what 
are human rights? Surely this requires 
some kind of sensus communis, in the 
sense of the global community engaged in 
conversation both now across cultures 
and with communities of the past. The 
scholar takes part in this larger 
conversation by her context within the 
community, just as on the smaller scale 
there is a conversation with the text by 
the positioning and re~ositioning of 
herself in relation to it 3• 
As in the global community, so in the 
microcosmic world of the scholar, the 
process of making judgments must be 
infonned by an ethics that is pragmatic 
and practical. Judgments from my reading 
must not be hidden away, but neither 
must they be aggressively presented. A 
considered, reasoned, and respectful 
response, even when negative, can set a 
sure groundwork for dialogue with those 
whose experience we have listened to. In 
this way we learn to distinguish between 
respect and permissiveness and avoid the 
vice of gutless tolerance. What matters is 
the quality of engagement with those with 
whom we disagree, that we have a 
willingness to be engaged, with the 
possibility that questions and opinions 
may change in that process. In the end it 
is in the behaviour and the exercise of 
power in the engagement which makes 
the difference to the outcome or even the 
possibility of dialogue. 
Power is present and used in very 
subtle ways. By the very fact that I make 
a judgment, even if I don't represent it as 
a universal judgment, I am actually 
demanding in a way that the person with 
whom I want to be in dialogue has to 
consider it. The other person has to 
consider at least the possibility that there 
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is something more, another perspective, 
to be considered and argued for or against 
or accepted as possible and so on. 
Thus, one of the key questions 
concerns the exercise of power in this 
whole process of making judgments and 
entering into conversation with others 
about these judgments. There are a 
multitude of paradigms for exercising 
power that we might choose from in our 
present cultural context: judgment made 
from a position of power of one race over 
others, of rich over poor, of male over 
female, of west over east, of true believer 
over pagan, of academic over 
non-academic, of academic over 
believer, ... Starhawk's Truth or Dare 
provides a useful framework for 
addressing the issue ofpower14. Rather 
than the power-over model of patriarchal 
systems, the model of "power-within" 
(the authority of our own ~xperience) and 
"power-with" (the authority of our own 
experience in dialogue with others' 
authority through personal experience) 
seems far more appropriate to the idea of 
a conversation. 
Of course, conversations can be 
one-sided or dominated by one of the 
speakers. Scholars will need to practice 
self-reflection and self-suspicion within 
the process, trying to remain aware of 
Marx's caveat of the hidden relation that 
connects ideology to the phenomena of 
domination 15. Particularly in 
cross-cultural dialogue, the dialogue 
partners must be careful from the very 
beginning to take into account where their 
cultures may have been related in the past 
in unequal positions of power through a 
colonial system of oppression16• 
One-sided or dominating 
conversations emphasise difference at the 
expense of the openness of the partners. 
Sarah Hoagland argues that although a 
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dialogue is based in difference, it must 
not necessarily follow that the 
acknowledgment of difference must be 
set in conflict or antagonism as a way of 
coming to self-awareness (contra Hegel), 
in a paradigm of power caught in the 
metaphor of master-slave. She proposes 
rather a dialogue in which the partners are 
"autokoenonous" ("one among many") 17. 
In such a dialogue the partners have a 
sense of their personal boundaries, not to 
limit interaction, but to provide the 
context for moral activity, where one has 
a part to play in relation to others and to 
certain situations18. . 
I have ranged very broadly in this 
address, but one point seems to circle 
again and again through the discussion; 
that is, the necessity of situating both the 
interpretive process and the dialogue 
about the judgments made during that 
process within the community context. 
The community is to be understood as 
broadly as the community of human 
beings, and as narrowly as the smaller 
communities within which we perform 
our everyday scholarly activity. The 
~<>.~ the contex~ for the activity 
of reading andl'or1IieO!alogical process 
of discriminating valuable judgment, and 
for that critique which leads to liberation 
or a clearer perception of the issues in a 
particular situation. It all sounds rather 
simple and obvious, but I think it needs to 
be said nonetheless to counter some of the 
distortion being advocated by the 
excessive subjective relativism or cultural 
relativism that has taken hold at present. 
In the end, the integrity of the scholar in 
the activity of interpretation is bound up 
with her/his actively critical life within 
global and local communities. 
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